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DIRT LAWYERS AND DIRTY REMICS: A DEBATE
In mid-2013, Professors Bradley T. Borden and David J. Reiss published an article in the
American Bar Association’s Probate & Property journal (May/June 2013, at 13), about the
disconnect between the securitization process and the mechanics of mortgage assignments. The
Borden/Reiss article discussed potential legal and tax issues caused by sloppiness in mortgage
assignments.
Joshua Stein responded to the Borden/Reiss article, arguing that the technicalities of mortgage
assignments serve no real purpose and should be eliminated. That article appeared in the
November/December 2013 issue of the same publication, at 6.
Stein’s response was accompanied by a commentary from Professors Borden and Reiss, which
also appeared in the November/December 2013 issue, at 8.
To follow the Borden/Reiss/Stein debate, click on the links in the left margin or on any
paragraph in the summary above.
For more information on the three authors, including contact information, click on these links:


Professor Bradley T. Borden



Professor David J. Reiss



Joshua Stein

For more information on ABA’s Probate & Property Journal, click here.
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Tim Bower

T

he day-to-day practice of real
estate law typically does not
touch on the intricacies of the
securitization of mortgages, let alone
the tax laws that apply to mortgagebacked securities. And that is okay.
What is not okay is that when structuring mortgaged-backed securities,
securitization professionals did not
account for the day-to-day practices
of lawyers as they relate to the transfer and assignment of mortgage notes
and mortgages. This disregard may
result in severe consequences for
investors, underwriters, and securitization professionals.
Of equal gravity is the responsibility to help shape policy that this state
of affairs imposes on “dirt,” or real
estate, lawyers, as members of society with specialized knowledge. As
the business cycle turns and the mortgage markets rise from the depths of
the bust, dirt lawyers should be sure
to make their views known about the
role law should play in the business
of real estate finance. In particular,
they should make clear, first, how
formalistic legal rules protect the
parties to a real estate finance transaction and, second, that these rules
should be treated with appropriate
deference. That formality can protect
the borrower from paying the debt
more than once or to the wrong party.

It also can protect the owner of the
note from disputes over whether the
underlying debt should be paid.
Take, for example, the negotiability
of mortgage notes, which is governed
by the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC). Notes can be sold by the thousands in run of the mill secondary
market transactions. Lenders much
prefer negotiable notes to nonnegotiable ones, so lenders are incentivized
to properly negotiate them. Trusts
are bulk purchasers of negotiable
instruments, which put the “security” in a mortgage-backed security
(MBS). These trusts are best protected
if they are holders in due course of
the negotiable instruments and thus
are incentivized to ensure that the
notes were properly negotiated. The
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rules of negotiability are quite clear
and designed for a broad swath of
the commercial world. Negotiation
of a typical mortgage note requires
delivery and the payee’s signature or
endorsement. Notwithstanding these
incentives and clear rules, a mountain
of recently revealed evidence indicates that many notes in secondary
market transactions were not properly negotiated.
One of the consequences of the
sale of a negotiable note not carried
out in accordance with the requirements of the holder in due course
doctrine is that the purchaser of the
note may not be free of the personal
defenses that the note maker (the
borrower) would have had against
the original lender. These personal
defenses include lack of consideration, nonperformance, actual
payment of the debt, and fraud in
the inducement. See UCC § 3-302.
Another consequence of the sale of
a note not done properly is that the
beneficial owner (as opposed to the
legal owner) may not be able to collect on the debt if the borrower is
in default. And a third—and until
recently hidden—consequence of an
improper sale of a note to a secondary market participant is that the
purchaser may fail to comply with
the requirements necessary to obtain
favorable tax treatment as a Real
Estate Mortgage Investment Conduit
(REMIC).
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Before 1986,
mortgage-backed securities
had various tax-related
inefficiencies.

This article builds on earlier discussions of these issues by the
authors. See Bradley T. Borden &
David J. Reiss, Wall Street Rules
Applied to REMIC Classification, Thomson Reuters News & Insight (Sept. 13,
2012), available at http://newsandin
sight.thomsonreuters.com/Securi
ties/Insight/2012/09_-_September/
Wall_Street_Rules_Applied_to_
REMIC_Classification, and Bradley
T. Borden & David J. Reiss, Once a
Failed REMIC, Never a REMIC, 30
Cayman Fin. Rev. 65 (1st Quarter
2013), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2185420.
Modern Residential
Real Estate Finance
Before 1986, MBSs had various
tax-related inefficiencies. Most
importantly, these securities were
taxable at the entity level, so investors faced double taxation. Wall
Street firms successfully lobbied
Congress to eliminate double taxation in 1986. This legislation created
the REMIC, which is not taxed at the
entity level. This one change automatically boosted REMIC yields over
other forms of MBSs that would still
be taxed. Unsurprisingly, REMICs
larglely displaced these other types of
MBSs and soon became the dominant
choice of entity for such transactions.
14
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A REMIC allows for the pooling
of mortgage loans that can then be
issued as multiple-tranche MBSs. A
REMIC is intended to be a passive
investment in a static pool of mortgages. Because of its passive nature, a
REMIC is limited on how and when it
can acquire mortgages. In most cases,
a REMIC must acquire its mortgages
within three months of its start-up.
IRC § 860G(a)(3)(ii), (9). The IRC contains draconian penalties for REMICs
that fail to comply with applicable legal requirements, the “REMIC
rules.”
In the 1990s, the housing finance
industry, still faced with the patchwork of state and local laws relating
to real estate, sought to streamline the
process of assigning mortgages from
the loan originator to a mortgage
pool. Industry players, including
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the
Mortgage Bankers Association, advocated for the Mortgage Electronic
Recording System (MERS), which
was up and running by the end of the
decade. A MERS mortgage contains
a statement that “MERS is a separate corporation that is acting solely
as nominee for the Lender and Lender’s successors and assigns. MERS
claims to be the mortgagee under
this Security Instrument.” MERS is
not, however, named on any note
endorsement. This new system saved
lenders small, but not insignificant,
amounts of money in recording fees
and administrative costs every time a
mortgage was transferred. The legal
status of this private recording system was not clear, and it had not been
ratified by Congress. Notwithstanding that fact, nearly all of the major
mortgage originators participated in
MERS, and it registered millions of
mortgages within a couple of years.
By 2009, MERS claimed to be the
nominal mortgagee on approximately
two-thirds of all newly originated residential loans.
Beginning in the early 2000s,
MERS and other parties in the mortgage securitization industry began
to relax many of the procedures and
practices they had originally used
to assign mortgages among industry players. Litigation documents

and decided cases reveal how relaxed
the procedures and practices became.
Hitting a crescendo right before the
global financial crisis, loan origination and securitization practices
became egregiously negligent.
The Rule of Law in the
Business of Real Estate
Even though some securitizers may
have complied with all of the terms
contained in the applicable Pooling and Servicing Agreements that
govern REMIC MBSs, the very low
tolerance for deviation in the REMIC
rules suggests that even a small
degree of noncompliance could result
in a finding that individual REMICs
have violated the strict requirements
of the IRC. This would cause those
REMICs to lose their preferred tax
status. Surprisingly, however, the IRS
appears to be unresponsive to this
issue so far, and this failure probably
contributed to the financial crisis to
some extent. See Bradley T. Borden,
Did the IRS Cause the Financial Crisis?,
Huffington Post, Oct. 18, 2012, available at www.huffingtonpost.com/
bradley-t-borden/did-the-irs-causethe-fin_b_1972207.html.
To obtain the REMIC classification,
a trust must satisfy several requirements. Of particular interest is the
requirement that within three months
after the trust’s start-up date substantially all of its assets must be qualified
mortgages. See IRC § 860D(a)(4). The
regulations provide that substantially
all of the assets of a trust are qualified mortgages if no more than a de
minimis amount of the trust’s assets
are not qualified mortgages. Treas.
Reg. § 1.860D-1(b)(3)(i). A “qualified mortgage” is an obligation that
is principally secured by an interest
in real property. See IRC § 860G(a)(3)
(A). Thus, to be a qualified mortgage,
an asset must satisfy both a timing requirement (be acquired within
three months after the start-up date)
and a definitional requirement (be an
obligation principally secured by an
interest in real property).
Industry practices raise questions about whether trusts satisfied
either the timing requirement or
the definitional requirement. The
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general practice was for trusts and
loan originators to enter into Pooling and Servicing Agreements, which
required the originator to transfer the
mortgage note and mortgage to the
trust. Nonetheless, reports and court
documents indicate that originators
and trusts frequently did not comply with the terms of the Pooling and
Servicing Agreements, and originators often retained possession of the
mortgage notes as MERS became the
nominee of record on the mortgage.
The failure to properly transfer
the mortgage note and mortgage
can cause a trust to fail both the
timing requirement and the definitional requirement that are necessary
to qualify for REMIC status. The
trust fails the timing requirement
because it does not acquire the requisite interests within the three-month
prescribed time frame. It fails the definition requirement because it does
not legally own the proper obligations, and what the trust does legally
own does not appear to be secured by
interests in real property.
Wall Street Rules or
Legal Rules?
Although Wall Street treated the
REMIC rules with disregard, they are
actually pretty straightforward in
broad outline. Federal tax law does
not rely on the state-law definition of
ownership, but it looks to state law
to determine parties’ rights, obligations, and interests in property. See,
e.g., Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103,
110 (1932). The tax definition of ownership would apply to the mortgage
notes. See Bradley T. Borden & David
J. Reiss, Beneficial Ownership and the
REMIC Classification Rules, 28 Tax
Mgmt. Real Est. J. 274 (Nov. 7, 2012).
Tax law also can disregard the transfer (or lack of transfer) of formal title
when the transferor retains many of
the benefits and burdens of ownership. See Bailey v. Commissioner, 912
F.2d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 1990).
Courts focus on whether the benefits and burdens of ownership pass
from one party to another when considering who the owner of property
is for tax purposes. Grodt & McKay
Realty, Inc. v. Commissioner, 77 T.C.

1221, 1237 (1981). The analysis of
ownership does not merely look to
the agreements the parties entered
into because the label parties give
to a transaction does not determine
its character. See Helvering v. F. & R.
Lazarus & Co., 308 U.S. 252, 255 (1939).
The analysis must examine the underlying economics and the attendant
facts and circumstances to determine
who owns the mortgage notes for tax
purposes. See id. Thus, even if a trust
owns a mortgage under Article 9 of
the UCC, it would not appear to be
the tax owner.
Courts in many states have considered the legal rights and obligations
of REMICs with respect to mortgage notes and mortgages that the
REMICs claim to own. Courts are
split, with some ruling in favor of
MERS as nominee for the REMIC and
others ruling in favor of other parties whose interests are adverse to the
REMIC and to MERS. Apparently no
court has considered how significant
these rules are for the REMIC classification for tax purposes. Standing to
foreclose and participate in a bankruptcy proceeding will likely affect
the tax analysis of whether REMIC
trust assets are secured by an interest
in real property, but they probably do
not affect the tax analysis of whether
REMIC trusts own obligations. (The
lack of standing should result in a
finding that the mortgage note is not
secured by an interest in real property.) This analysis turns on the
ownership of the mortgage notes.
The practices at Countrywide
Home Loans, Inc. (one of the nation’s
largest loan originators in terms of
volume during the boom and now
part of Bank of America) illustrate
the behavior of mortgage securitizers
during that period of time. The court
in In re Kemp, 440 B.R. 624 (Bankr.
D.N.J. 2010), documents in painful
detail how Countrywide failed to
transfer possession of a note to the
pool backing a MBS, and thus failed
to comply with the requirements
necessary for that mortgage to comply with the REMIC rules. Numerous
other filings and reports suggest that
Countrywide’s practices were typical of many major lenders during the
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early 2000s. A suit filed by the New
York Attorney General also details in
its allegations how loan originators
and REMIC sponsors colluded to populate REMICs with mortgages that
inadvertently did not comply with
the REMIC rules. See Complaint, New
York v. J.P. Morgan Securities LLC, No.
451556/2012 (County of New York,
Oct. 1, 2012). A suit filed on behalf
of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae also
alleges that the practices of loan originators have negative implications
for the REMICs’ tax-advantaged status. See Complaint, Federal Hous. Fin.
Agency v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., No.
11 Civ. 6188 (DLC), 2012 WL 5395646
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2011).
The practices of loan originators
and REMIC sponsors have caused
severe losses and have undermined
the American property system. Significant litigation has grown out of
those losses. To date, hundreds of
suits have been filed that allege a
range of behaviors in the securitization industry that have consequences
for the REMIC rules. For reports on
such litigation, see Bradley T. Borden
& David J. Reiss, REFinBlog (Feb. 26,
2013, 5:00 p.m.), http://refinblog.com.
The resulting tax consequences for
REMICs that failed to comply with
the REMIC rules may be staggering.
Kemp addressed the issue of
enforceability of a note under the

Although Wall Street treated
the REMIC rules with disregard,
they are actually pretty
straightforward in
broad outline.
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UCC for bankruptcy purposes. See
440 B.R. at 626. The court in that case
held that a note was unenforceable
against the maker of the note and the
maker’s property under New Jersey
law on two grounds. The court held
that because the beneficial owner of
the note, the Bank of New York (the
trustee of a pool of mortgages that
backed an MBS that included the
mortgage at issue in the case) did
not have possession, and because
the note lacked proper endorsement
on sale, the note was unenforceable.
Recognizing that the mortgage note
came within the UCC definition of
negotiable instrument, the court then
considered who is entitled to enforce
a negotiable instrument, but held that
no such person was a party in Kemp.
The flaws in the opinion documents are shocking, even after the
revelations regarding industry practices that have come to light since the
subprime bust. These flaws include
• the originator failing to convey
possession of the note to the
intended assignee, the trustee of
the pool;
• the originator failing to endorse
the note to the intended
assignee;

The flaws in the opinion
documents are shocking,
even after the revelations
regarding industry practices
that have come to light since
the subprime bust.

16
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• the originator failing to affix an
allonge to the note;
• the originator producing a Lost
Note Certification in the same
filing in which it claims to have
located the original note;
• the originator transferring the
note to the trustee only after the
filing of the proof of claim; and
• the originator failing to maintain corporate formalities to
distinguish it from its affiliates,
as those formalities relate to the
issue of possession of the note.
The consequences of these flaws play
out for the borrower, the legal owner
of the debt, and the trustee (the beneficial owner) of the pool of mortgages
securing the MBS, which includes the
mortgage at issue in the case.
As the Kemp court notes:
From the maker’s standpoint, . . .
it becomes essential to establish
that the person who demands
payment of a negotiable note, or
to whom payment is made, is
the duly qualified holder. Otherwise, the obligor is exposed
to the risk of double payment,
or at least to the expense of litigation incurred to prevent
duplicative satisfaction of the
instrument. These risks provide makers with a recognizable
interest in demanding proof of
the chain of title.
440 B.R. at 631 (quoting Adams v.
Madison Realty & Dev., Inc., 853 F.2d
163, 168 (3d Cir. 1988)). Because the
originator did not comply with the
legal niceties, the beneficial owner of
the debt, the trustee, cannot file its
proof of claim, either.
The Kemp court did not address
the third type of consequence (for the
trustee) because it was not an issue
before the court. Nonetheless, the analysis in Kemp illustrates how courts
can reach results that undercut arguments that REMICs were the owners
of the mortgage notes and mortgages
that were purportedly sold to them for
REMIC rules purposes.
Even if the majority of jurisdictions
issue foreclosure and bankruptcy

rulings that have favorable consequences for REMICs, the few with
negative consequences can destroy
the REMIC classification of many
mortgage-backed securities that were
structured to be—and promoted
to investors as—REMICs. This is
because rating agencies require that
REMICs be geographically diversified to spread the risk of defaults
caused by local economic conditions.
Most, if not all, REMICs own mortgage notes and mortgages from states
governed by laws that the courts may
determine do not support REMIC
eligibility for the mortgages from
those jurisdictions. This diversification requirement makes it very likely
that REMICs will have more than a
de minimis amount of mortgages that
do not come within the definition of a
qualified mortgage under the REMIC
regulations. Professionals who helped
structure these securitizations may
face liability if the IRS were to find
that a purported REMIC was just
purported and not truly a REMIC.
Conclusion
As lawsuits arising from the housing
boom allocate liability and damages
arising from faulty securitizations
among investors, underwriters, and
securitization professionals, lawyers
may feel no more empowered to take
corrective action than homeowners
do. Individual lawyers might feel as
if they do not have much leverage
over lenders, over title companies, or
over Wall Street firms. And indeed,
they do not. But as members of bar
associations and trade associations,
as informed constituents of elected
officials, as wielders of the pen, they
can attempt to influence policy and
industry practices that they believe
to be harmful to a well-ordered real
estate market.
Looking back to the housing boom
in the early 2000s, at the time some
said that things could not keep going
on like this. They were right, and the
United States is now suffering the serious consequences. Let us now commit
to speaking out in real time to reduce
the chances that history repeats itself,
at least in our lifetimes. n
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Letters to the Editor
Dirt Lawyers versus Wall Street:
A Different View
In the securitization boom that preceded
the financial crisis, people became
sloppy about the technical details of
transferring residential mortgages
from the originator to intermediaries
and ultimately to real estate mortgage
investment conduit (REMIC) entities for
securitization. Bradley T. Borden and
David J. Reiss described the magnitude
of the mess, and its possible legal, tax,
and practical consequences, in the cover
article of the May/June 2013 issue of
this publication.
Notes were not properly endorsed.
Lenders lost them. Assignments were
never recorded, or were recorded in the
wrong order or with gaps. Transfers
that should have been made weren’t.
Notes followed one path of transfers,
mortgages another. When the music
stopped, enforcement became a problem because servicers couldn’t figure
out the paper trail. To fill gaps, those in
the back room sometimes undertook a
goal-oriented creative writing program.
Because of all that sloppiness, transferees of loans sometimes flunked the
basic tests to become holders in due
course. Borrowers faced the theoretical
risk of having to pay their loans twice.
REMICs maybe failed to qualify under
the tax law, exposing their investors to
tax disasters.
One might add that, as a result of
all this, mortgage borrowers in default
have had a field day delaying or even
derailing foreclosures by claiming that
the plaintiff lacked standing because it
couldn’t prove ownership of the note
and mortgage. And when loan servicers
tried to clean up the files, borrowers
cried fraud and robo-signing, while
remaining in default.
Next time around, Borden and Reiss
argue, we should do it right. Legal technicalities and niceties do matter. When
we move mortgages, we should get
the notes properly endorsed, the right
assignments signed, and everything
recorded both promptly and correctly.
6

n

Yes, the securitization boom left
behind a mess. Yes, messes are bad. But
there’s more to the discussion. The postsecuritization residential foreclosure
mess should prompt larger questions
about how we evidence, document, and
transfer ownership of mortgage loans.
Does our system make any sense
at all? Do the technical requirements
that Borden and Reiss describe—now
creating so much trouble for foreclosures—still serve any purpose in the
21st century? They certainly create
tremendous paperwork, complexity,
and legal issues, most of which seem
entirely spurious and unnecessary.
They also create tremendous opportunities for error. As Borden and Reiss
show, the mortgage origination and
securitization industries seem to have
fully seized all those opportunities. But
do those troublesome technical requirements give anyone any protection that
matters?
Yes, it’s certainly nice for a mortgage
holder to be a holder in due course. But
how often does holder-in-due-course
status matter for today’s institutional
residential mortgages? How often does
the purchaser of such a loan actually
benefit by taking free of defenses based
on fraud or previous payment? How
often has a loan purchaser been able
to enforce against the borrower a previously repaid loan just because the
purchaser was a holder in due course?
Today’s residential mortgages are
so wrapped up with consumer protections that any holder of the loan would
have trouble enforcing a mortgage loan
that was truly subject to, for example,
fraud in the inducement. As a practical
matter, in the world of residential mortgages all defenses probably travel with
the loan, so holder-in-due-course status
has no real significance to a mortgage
purchaser. It matters for checks and
commercial transactions, but not for
residential mortgages.
Borden and Reiss point out that

traditional requirements for endorsement and delivery of the original
promissory note also protect the borrower from the risk of having to pay the
loan twice. While that risk may exist in
theory, if the borrower had in fact paid
the loan, that would typically provide a
complete defense against foreclosure.
Any discussion that treats promissory notes as a measure to mitigate the
risk of double payment relies on the
fantasy that when the borrower repays
the loan, he will demand that the lender
prove possession of the note and the
right string of endorsements.
If any residential borrower actually
asked to see the note at the time of payoff, the servicer’s first response would
consist of confusion and laughter.
When his laughter died down, the servicer would explain that the note was
lost years ago. Or perhaps the servicer
might advise the borrower to speak to
someone else in some other department
that never answers the phone. The borrower would eventually give up.
Practically speaking, in today’s
world, the main function of any original
promissory note consists of getting lost.
If any mortgage borrower anywhere
in the United States had ever actually
needed to pay their mortgage loan a
second time to keep their house, we
would all have heard about it; even one
instance would have prompted a tremendous outcry. But has anyone ever
heard of that actually happening?
Even if requirements for presentation of the note could prevent the risk of
double payment, they wouldn’t achieve
that goal, for two reasons. First, as mentioned, many notes get lost. Second,
residential lenders often require the borrower to sign multiple original notes.
In other words, the requirement for a
mortgage holder to show possession of
the note doesn’t actually give the borrower much protection.
Outside of real estate, many loans
no longer require promissory notes,
nor are they burdened by the technical
requirements of the recording system
or of negotiable instruments. No one
cares about original notes, or holder in
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due course. Borrowers in those transactions have not faced an epidemic
of double payment claims. Purchasers of these loans, or interests in them,
haven’t suffered great losses for lack of
an original piece of paper or holder-indue-course status.
Unlike mortgage assignments,
corporate stock and other financial
instruments are transferred electronically with little to no documentation.
The transfer system itself keeps track
of everything. If corporate stock transfers followed the mortgage model,
every corporation would have its own
detailed set of rules, requirements,
fees, filings, and forms for stock transfer documentation. Every transfer of
a single share of stock would require
dealing with multiple pieces of paper
with numerous signatures and could
take weeks, with endless opportunities
for problems and mistakes. Transferring 100 shares would require 100 sets
of fully compliant documentation. But
none of that happens, because the
corporate stock transfer system is simple, functional, reliable, and largely
electronic.
The 21st century is a great time to
revisit the legal principles and practices
that drive the complexity and paperwork that led to the mistakes described
by Borden and Reiss.
We could start by eliminating promissory notes in mortgage transactions.
Instead, we could document real estate
loans as contractual promises in which
possession of an original piece of paper
has no particular significance. A promissory note is not essential to evidencing
an obligation to pay, secured or not.
Ownership of a loan could be presumptively determined based on an
institution’s books and records, and a
history of loan payments.
We might even go a few steps further
and establish a central registrar to keep
track of who owns mortgage loans and
who has the right to foreclose. Transfers could be confirmed electronically,
with no paperwork at all. A registrar’s
certificate would evidence the right to
foreclose.
The Mortgage Electronic Registration System (MERS) seemed like a great
move in that direction. MERS contemplated that a lender would record its

mortgage once, in favor of MERS,
then any future mortgage assignments could take place electronically,
without the paperwork, pitfalls,
delays, and variations—and now
legal issues—entailed by generating
and filing documents with thousands of recording systems across the
United States.
But the same antiquated legal
notions that created so much trouble for
mortgage assignments have also created trouble for MERS. County clerks
anxious to protect revenue, employment, and the importance of their
offices joined forces with the foreclosure
defense bar to try to derail the MERS
train. Judges seized the opportunity
MERS gave them to help defaulting
borrowers stay in their homes, and to
create new law—and to achieve good
consumer protection headlines—in an
area that suddenly assumed great public importance. The result: a MERS mess
with conflicting decisions from coast to
coast, and many more months of borrower defaults with impunity.
That doesn’t mean MERS was a bad
idea. Our leaders should figure out
how real estate law can accommodate
and support MERS and move into the
21st century. The idea of a single central
registry for mortgage transfers makes
sense. It would make even more sense
to expand that central registry to cover
all property-related transfers, replacing
a system that often seems as outdated
as quill pens and parchment.
Any proposal to blow up and recreate our system of land records and
mortgage loan assignments will face a
predictable set of objections. Jobs will
be lost, though other jobs created. Tax
collectors might have trouble collecting
taxes. The transition process won’t go
perfectly. After the transition, real estate
lawyers and paralegals will have less
work to do. Will the system adequately
protect and preserve online data? Will it
invade privacy? And, of course, it might
create new opportunities for fraud.
A better system for mortgage assignments would also speed foreclosures.
Would that be so bad? If a borrower
can no longer afford his house and the
market won’t let him sell for more than
the mortgage balance, then he doesn’t
really own the house anyway. The
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mortgage holder does, for all practical
purposes. Every month the borrower
has the option to keep the house by
making that month’s payment. If
he can’t make those payments, or
chooses not to, that’s unfortunate, but
he still doesn’t have any equity in the
house. He should find a new place to
live, just as millions of other Americans do each year.
Foreclosures are part of any mortgage finance system, one possible
outcome when someone borrows
money and grants security. If we can’t
stomach residential foreclosures, maybe
the federal government should just buy
everyone a house.
Commercial real estate is, of course,
a different story. It is less fungible than
houses. The roles of borrower and
lender are more complex, nuanced,
and interrelated. The identity of the
borrower matters. And commercial
foreclosures do not seem to have experienced the same problems as residential
foreclosures.
Aside from speeding up residential
foreclosures, any attempt to fix loan
transfers will also raise well-founded
concerns that trying to change anything
will just make it worse. But if we take a
gradual and careful approach—perhaps
moving state by state—to bringing our
real estate documentation and security
systems into the 21st century, then over
time it should be possible to overcome
these and other objections. The United
States did something like that, though
not as dramatic, when Revised Article
9 became effective in 2001. Nothing too
disastrous happened.
Some would argue that today’s system protects mortgage borrowers by
making it hard for mortgage lenders to
spuriously enforce a mortgage loan that
they don’t own or perhaps that isn’t
even in default. Today’s system may do
that. Aggressively applied by the courts,
it puts mortgage lenders to the test and
forces them to prove they own the loan
they want to foreclose. When paperwork deficiencies prevent the lender
from proving standing, the lender gets
thrown out of court.
In these cases, however, the borrower
is still in default. And, realistically, lenders don’t often try to foreclose on loans
they don’t own or that aren’t in default.
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When the court throws lenders out of
court because of issues of standing, the
defaulting borrower gets to keep her
house, at least until the right paperwork
gets lined up and submitted. In that
time, as long as four years for a residential foreclosure proceeding in New York,
the borrower typically doesn’t pay debt
service, insurance, or real estate taxes.
Once in a while the defaulting borrower
gets really lucky: the paperwork is so
bad that no one actually has the right to
foreclose.
All of this produces extraordinarily
long, complex residential mortgage
foreclosures, destabilizing neighborhoods and preventing property values
from recovering. When it isn’t clear
who owns a property and no one has
an incentive to maintain it, and nothing about the foreclosure gets resolved
quickly, the mortgage collateral inevitably festers and deteriorates. Today’s
clumsy system for documenting mortgage loan transfers puts properties
into legal limbo for years as a result of
paperwork requirements that might be
quaint and funny if they didn’t create
so much trouble.
Let’s assume, though, that a genuine
risk exists that a mortgage lender might
in fact try to foreclose a loan it doesn’t
own against a borrower who isn’t in
default. To address that risk, one could
say that if a mortgage borrower ever
lost his house under any such circumstances, he should be entitled to recover
treble (or more) damages, plus attorney’s fees, from the originator of his
mortgage or whoever wrongfully took
his house. The borrower would have
the same right if she were forced to pay
the same loan twice. Some state laws
may already give borrowers rights like
these; there, no change in law would be
necessary at all.
With suitable safeguards, a streamlined system to track mortgage
assignments would give borrowers
ample protection.
In a separate discussion, Borden and
Reiss also argue that technical glitches
in transfers of mortgages may have
caused many REMICs to fail the various technical tests established under the
Internal Revenue Code. The solution to
that problem, if it really is one, would be
much easier to adopt than other measures suggested earlier in this article.

Solving the REMIC problem would
require nothing more than a technical
amendment to the Internal Revenue
Code, which is, after all, entirely capable of being amended. The Code should
say that as long as a REMIC directly or
indirectly holds the risks and benefits
of a mortgage loan, and cleans up any
technical imperfections in its ownership
within a reasonable time after learning
of them, that should be just as good as if
the REMIC actually owned the loan.
The apparent lack of publicized
REMIC disqualifications to date may
tell us that the IRS applies the REMIC
requirements with the practicality and

flexibility suggested in the previous
paragraph. If that’s true, then perhaps
nothing need be done.
The problems Borden and Reiss
describe do definitely cry out for
action—but not necessarily the action
they suggest. Instead of exalting the
technicalities of the current system, we
should get rid of them. We should massively simplify loan transfers and revise
the law as necessary to do that.
Joshua Stein
Joshua Stein PLLC
New York, New York

Dirty REMICs, Revisited
Before setting pen to paper to draft
our response to Joshua Stein’s “Different View,” we had to look down to
see whether the shoe was on the other
foot. A preeminent real estate lawyer
was criticizing two law professors for
advocating for strict construction of
documents and statutes and for thinking too small. And that practitioner
was also advocating for a revolution in
real estate finance, for sweeping away
borrower protections that had been
developed over a millennia under our
common law system, and for replacing
the status quo with an efficient system designed by the financial industry,
along the lines of the Mortgage Electronic Recording System (MERS). We
expect to find that kind of thinking in
law review articles!
Because our different approaches
so clearly demonstrate the opposing
views in the debate over the future
of residential real estate finance, we
will first review those differences and
then highlight where they converge. In
the end, we hope that real estate lawyers of all stripes can come together
with an approach to residential real
estate finance that is efficient and also
provides reasonable protections for
homeowners.
Those Troublesome Technical
Requirements!
Stein asks whether “those troublesome

technical requirements give anyone
any protection that matters.” Before
going to the substance of the question,
we would first ask, would Mr. Stein
waive a strict notice requirement contained in a commercial lease if doing so
would harm his client? If not (and we
are pretty sure it is “not”), why would
a different rule apply with homeowners? Certainly residential lenders don’t
routinely waive “troublesome” requirements such as the one that requires
monthly payments to be made by a certain date in order to avoid a late penalty.
As to the substance of Mr. Stein’s
inquiry, we would answer—yes, technical requirements matter. As just one
example, only certain parties can foreclose on a mortgage. Technical state law
requirements ensure that the plaintiff is
one of those parties and protect borrowers from defending actions by parties
without standing to foreclose. Again,
I am confident that Mr. Stein would
insist on such a technical requirement if
it were his commercial client who was
faced with a foreclosure. What is good
for the commercial goose is good for the
residential gander as far as we can tell.
Another example: Stein’s dismissal
of the relevance of the holder-in-duecourse status in residential mortgage
finance ignores the key role it played
in the debate over state anti-predatory lending legislation throughout
the boom years in the early 2000s. See
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loans and who has the right to foregenerally David Reiss, Subprime Stanhas for residential and commercial real
close. As Stein acknowledges, this is a
dardization: How Rating Agencies Allow
estate finance transactions. But we are
lot like the Mortgage Electronic RegPredatory Lending to Flourish in the Secgrateful that he has taken our arguistration System (MERS). But Stein
ondary Mortgage Market, 33 Fla. St. U. L.
ment seriously and agree with him that
does not acknowledge any of the conRev. 985 (2006).
the stakes are high for borrowers and
troversy surrounding MERS, which
And another: Stein argues that
for the real estate finance industry. We
was created by private interests such
payment would “typically provide
agree that structural reform that would
as Fannie, Freddie, and the Mortgage
a complete defense against forecloseek to modernize the system of resisure” in the case of a second foreclosure Bankers Association. They did not
dential real estate finance is called for.
believe that they needed the approval
brought by the true owner of the debt.
But until that reform is in place, we will
of federal, state, or local governments,
That misstates the real issue. The real
continue to advocate for the enforceor anyone else for that matter, to draissue is whether a borrower would
ment of procedural protections and for
matically change the recording system
have to defend an action to collect the
strong tax enforcement.
for mortgages. Things appeared to go
debt brought by a true owner after
We would also emphasize that a
another party brought a successful fore- swimmingly for a few years, but the
thoughtful process for adopting proshortcuts MERS took wrought a toll on
closure action. The clear answer is yes;
posed reforms is not only important to
it. Stein’s takeaway: do it again.
they would need to pay for the defense
ensure that all stakeholders are repreOur takeaway: if we do it again, let’s
of such a suit. And, in Arizona at least,
sented but also to ensure the long-term
remember that process matters. Consult legitimacy of the new system. And we
they might be liable for that debt to
with all of the stakeholders, including
the true owner under certain circumcannot emphasize enough how importhose representing borrowers’ interests.
stances! See William K. Akina, David
tant we believe consumer protection
Promote efficiency, but respect the body is to a well-functioning residential real
J. Reiss & Bradley T. Borden, Show Me
of law that has developed around mort- estate finance system. A thousand years
the Note!, Westlaw J. Bank & Lender
gages. Accept that consumer protection
Liability 3 (June 3, 2013) (available at
of precedents in law and equity back us
is not only the right thing to promote
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
up on that.
but that consumer protection also procfm?abstract_id=2274977 and http://
motes responsible lending.
works.bepress.com/david_reiss/63).
Bradley T. Borden
And a last one: Stein argues that we
David Reiss
The Future of Residential
are mistaken in calling for the IRS to
Brooklyn Law School
Real Estate Finance
enforce the REMIC rules as they are
Brooklyn, New York
We have poked fun at Mr. Stein a bit
written so that the Treasury can collect
for the double standard we believe he
revenue properly due to it by noncompliant purported REMICs. The general
tax enforcement policy is that if you do
not comply with the strict requirements
2013 RPTE Law Student
for avoiding taxation, you will pay tax
Writing
Contest Winners
on the transaction. We do not understand why Stein would have a special
Congratulations to the 2013 Law Student Writing Contest winners:
rule for REMICs. It makes us wonder
First place—Jessica Beess und Chrostin of Harvard Law School: “Mandatory
whether he believes that commercial
real estate transactions should be gener- Arbitration Clauses in Donative Instruments: A Taxonomy of Disputes and Typeally exempt from strict compliance with Differentiated Analysis.”
Second place—Rebecca Gross of Georgetown University Law School: “Intestate
the Internal Revenue Code. For instance,
the period for identifying properties for Intent: Presumed Will Theory, Duty Theory, and the Flaw of Relying on Average
Decedent Intent.”
like kind exchanges under IRC
Third place—Kyle Belz of Stetson University College of Law: “No Covenant for
§ 1031 could be a few months instead
Old Men: Restrictive Covenants’ Impact on Aging in Place.”
of 45 days after the transfer of the relinThe goal of the RPTE student writing contest is to encourage and reward law
quished property, and the exchange
student writing on the subjects of real property or trust and estate law. The essay
could happen 180 days, give or take,
contest is designed to attract students to these law specialties and to encourage
after that transfer. That would be very
scholarship and interest in these areas. Articles submitted for judging are encourefficient for investors, too!
aged to be on timely topics and have not been previously published.
Law Professors Thinkin’ Small
Jessica Beess und Chrostin, the first place winner, will receive $2,500 cash, a
one-year free membership in the Section, and free round-trip airfare and weekend
Stein argues that we should sweep
accommodations to attend the Section’s Fall Leadership Meeting, November 7–9,
away a lot of the technical require2013, in New Orleans (valued at approximately $1,000). In addition, Jessica’s essay
ments relating to mortgages and adds
will be considered for publication in a future issue of the Real Property, Trust and
that we might even go a few steps furEstate Law Journal. Rebecca Gross, the second place winner, will receive $1,500 cash,
ther and establish a central registrar
and Kyle Belz, the third place winner, will receive $1,000 cash.
to keep track of who owns mortgage
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